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ABSTRACT 
The recent SNC-Lavalin scandal and its political fallout have drawn 
public attention to an existing culture of impunity enjoyed by corporate 
criminal wrongdoers, despite the 2004 changes to the Criminal Code of 
Canada that intended to make corporate prosecutions easier. In this article, 
I argue that the conceptual problems with corporate criminal liability may 
lie in the criminal justice system’s general misapprehension of the nature of 
corporate crime; especially of the distinct nature of the harm experienced 
by white collar victims. I further argue that, therefore, part of the solution 
to under-enforcement may be evidentiary: the Crown and courts should, 
where applicable, allow and particularly, encourage the victims of corporate 
crime to testify at sentencing hearings, on the occasions that corporations 
do go to trial. This will increase public awareness of the harms suffered by 
corporate victims and may thus increase support for greater enforcement 
generally, through both prosecutions and plea bargains. Finally, I consider 
the challenges to a victim-oriented understanding of corporate crime posed 
by the introduction of the remediation agreement in Canada. I compare the 
Canadian context to that of the United States — where deferred 
prosecutions agreements have long been in use and long caused such 
problems — to suggest how these problems may be avoided given the 
differences between the two countries’ substantive law on corporate crime. 
* Assistant Professor, California Western School of Law. Many thanks to the participants
in the Robson Crim symposium for their comments on this paper, both before and
after the symposium. Portions of Part III of this paper, on the evidentiary function of
victim impact statements, will also appear in “Victim Impact Statements and Corporate
Sex Crimes,” forthcoming in a symposium volume of the Oklahoma Law Review. Thanks
to the participants in that symposium as well for their comments, which have improved
both papers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
n 2007, Hamilton couple Norman and Georgette Hawe, now in their
80s, placed $450,000, the sum of both of their life savings, into an 
investment plan managed by an entity called Golden Gate Funds.1 
They were told that their money would be invested in a portfolio of 
mortgages, but Golden Gate diverted it for other purposes instead.  The 
Hawes lost their savings and instead of retiring in comfort, they were forced 
to sell their home. “I started working when I was 21 years old,” Norman 
Hawe told the Globe and Mail in 2013, “I did a job for this guy from 
Hamilton here, and he owed me $400. And he wouldn’t pay me. ... So, you 
know what I did? I went up and I stuck a knife in his four tires. And this, I 
lost $450,000, and I haven’t done anything.”2 The inaction Hawe refers to 
is actually the government’s. The Golden Gate case never came before a 
criminal court, but it did come before the Ontario Securities Commission 
(OSC), which can only impose monetary penalties. In 2009, Golden Gate’s 
owner, Ernest Anderson, settled with the OSC, acknowledged his 
misrepresentations to investors, and agreed to a $4.7 million fine, which he 
never paid. 
The Hawes’ story may not exactly echo down the corridors of power, 
but it does reveal a certain background lack of attention to white-collar 
misconduct that set the stage for what has become one of the greatest 
political scandals in Canadian history. A former federal Attorney General, 
Jody Wilson-Raybould, contends that she was pressured by Justin Trudeau’s 
Office of the Prime Minister to offer construction giant SNC-Lavalin a 
remediation agreement that would allow it to avoid criminal conviction 
under section 380 of the Criminal Code3 and the Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act (CFPOA),4 in connection with its alleged payment of $48 
1 Jeff Gray & Janet McFarland, “Crime Without Punishment: Canada’s Investment 
Fraud Problem”, The Globe and Mail (24 August 2013), online: <www.theglobeandmail. 
com/report-on-business> [perma.cc/SSZ2-WE7J]. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 380 [Criminal Code]. 
4 Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, SC 1998, c 34. 
I 
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million in bribes to Libyan government officials.5 While SNC-Lavalin ended 
up unsuccessful in its attempt to secure an agreement, its extensive lobbying 
efforts have been cited as the impetus for Parliament adopting the 
remediation agreement mechanism in the first place,6 in the 2018 
amendments to the Criminal Code.7 
While the political aspects of the SNC-Lavalin affair have struck a 
particularly sharp note of outrage in the public at large, the company’s 
misconduct arose in the same context that saw the Hawes’ lost retirement 
savings go unpunished: the Crown’s under-enforcement of white-collar 
crime and, in particular, its reluctance to bring criminal charges against 
corporations. Indeed, SNC-Lavalin is unique insofar as it was charged. Since 
the introduction, in 2004, of statutory corporate criminal liability under 
sections 22.1 and 22.2 of the Criminal Code, very few corporations have 
faced criminal charges.8 While this suggests that corporate giants like SNC-
Lavalin have reason to believe they may engage in large-scale corruption with 
impunity, it also means that smaller victims of corporate crime receive little 
or no protection from the criminal justice system.9 And, there is at least 
some reason to believe that such victims exist: according to a 2012 survey 
by the British Columbia Securities Commission, 17% of Canadians over 
age 50 believe they have been the victim of investment fraud at some point 
in their lives and 29% of active investors so believe.10 Furthermore, the 
Crown has brought only a handful of charges against corporate employers 
(none of them major industry players) under the new Criminal Code 
provisions, specifically intended to address criminal negligence in workplace 
5 See “What the SNC-Lavalin Scandal Reveals About Corporate Influence on Canadian 
Democracy”, CBC Radio (15 February 2019), online: <www.cbc.ca/radio/day6/episode-
429-snc-lavalin-s-lobbying-> [perma.cc/7758-W6S5].
6 Ibid. 
7 Criminal Code, supra note 3, Part XXII.1, “Remediation Agreements”. 
8 See Norm Keith, Corporate Crime, Accountability, and Social Responsibility in Canada, 2nd 
ed (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2016); Lincoln Caylor & Nathan Sheehan, 
“Canadian Corporate Criminal Liability” (18 March 2019), online: Mondaq <www.mon 
daq.com/canada/Criminal-Law> [perma.cc/J67G-QX9X]. 
9 White collar offenses are, of course, frequently prosecuted administratively — by the 
Securities Commissions as in the Golden Gate case and by other relevant bodies such 
as provincial Occupational Health and Safety agencies. For example, Alberta 
Occupational Health and Safety investigated 23 workplace fatalities in 2012 and 27 in 
2011. See Wayne Renke, Book Review of Still Dying for a Living: Corporate Criminal 
Liability after the Westray Mine Disaster by Steven Bittle, (2014) 51:3 Alta L Rev 677.   
10 See Gray & MacFarland, supra note 1. 
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conditions, despite the numerous workplace deaths that have occurred since 
their addition.11 And, since the adoption of the CFPOA in 1999, only four 
companies have been convicted for corruption, compared to the nearly 200 
convicted during the same time in the U.S. under the parallel Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA).12 Even scaling for the respective sizes of the 
jurisdictions, it is unlikely that this disparity reflects an underlying 
difference in actual levels of corruption. Given the global 
interconnectedness of the economy, Canadian corporations are competing 
in the same markets as their American counterparts and thus, they are 
subject to the same pressures that encourage corrupt business practices. 
This article does not attempt to solve the entire problem of white-collar 
criminal under-enforcement or even to debate the merits of Parliament’s 
decision to introduce remediation agreements into this legal landscape. 
Instead, it argues that victim testimony at sentencing has an important role 
to play against the conceptual hurdles that may deter corporate prosecution. 
Because a corporation cannot go to jail, it may not seem, from a retributive 
standpoint, to be an attractive target for scarce prosecutorial resources. I 
argue that the conceptual problems with corporate criminal liability lie in 
the criminal justice system’s general misapprehension of the nature of 
corporate crime; especially of the distinct nature of the harm experienced 
by corporate victims. Prosecutors should, in making charging decisions, 
attend to this harm through interaction with corporate victims. And, both 
prosecutors and courts should, where applicable, encourage the victims of 
corporate crime to testify at sentencing hearings on the rare occasions when 
corporations do go to trial. To the extent that the media circulates these 
victim stories, they will raise public awareness of the human costs of white-
collar crime which will create a stronger public mandate for white collar 
enforcement generally.  
11 See Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, “Westray Bill (Bill C-45)-
Overview” (last modified 5 May 2020), online: <www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/legisl/billc 
45.html> [perma.cc/6Q8R-Z8ER]; Steven Bittle, Still Dying for a Living: Corporate
Criminal Liability after the Westray Mine Disaster (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012) at 31–
34, citing R v Metron Construction Corporation, 2012 ONCJ 506; R v Scrocca, 2010 QCCQ
8218. See also R v Transpavé Inc, 2008 QCCQ 1598; R v Pétroles Global Inc, 2012 QCCQ
5749.
12 See Joanna Harrington, “SNC-Lavalin Case Shows Why We Should Review Canada’s
Corruption Laws” (26 February 2019), online: The Conversation <theconversation.com/
snc-lavalin-case> [perma.cc/3358-DQJ5]; US, Securities and Exchange Commission,
SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases (Washington, DC: SEC, last modified 9 January
2020), online: <www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml> [perma.cc/338G-JF6L].
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I proceed in four parts. In Part II, I give an overview of the common law 
and statutory basis for corporate criminal liability in Canada — including its 
historical origins in public outcry over harm to victims — and the major 
scholarly questions it raises.  In Part III, I collect evidence suggesting that 
some of the harm suffered by victims of corporate crime is psychological and 
it arises directly from the corporate nature of the criminal — above and 
beyond the direct physical and economic harms that may also be properly 
attributed to individual human employees. In Part IV, I describe the 
evidentiary and constitutional bases on which the Crown may lead victim 
impact evidence during sentencing and argue that such evidence is highly 
probative of the nature of corporate criminal harm. I suggest that such 
evidence enhances the expressive function of the criminal law by resolving 
its conceptual disconnect around the idea of corporate criminal liability that 
contributes to under-enforcement. Specifically, victim impact statements 
given in one trial, if disseminated by the media, may serve to increase public 
understanding of corporate harm as criminal and contribute to a mandate 
for future enforcement. Finally, in Part V, I consider the problems for a 
victim-oriented understanding of corporate crime posed by the introduction 
of the remediation agreement to Canada. I compare the Canadian context 
to that of the United States — where deferred prosecution agreements 
(DPAs) have long been in use and long caused such problems — to make 
suggestions for how best to avoid them, given the differences between the 
two countries’ substantive law on corporate crime. 
II. CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CANADA: AN
OVERVIEW
Corporate criminal liability has common law origins in Canada13 and 
was formally recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in 1985 in 
R v Canadian Dredge and Dock Co.14 In that case, the Court adopted the 
English “identification theory” of corporate criminal mens rea, which allows 
13 See R v Fane Robinson Ltd, [1941] 3 DLR 409, 76 CCC 196 (Alta SC (AD)), Ford JA for 
the majority; R v JJ Beamish Construction Co Ltd et al, [1966] 2 OR 867, 59 DLR (2d) 6 
(Ont SC), Jessup J, as he then was; R v St Lawrence Corp Ltd, [1969] 2 OR 305, 5 DLR 
(3d) 263 (Ont CA), Schroeder J for the Court; R v Parker Car Wash Systems Ltd (1977), 35 
CCC (2d) 37, 1 BLR 213 (Ont SC), Hughes J; R v PG Marketplace Ltd (1979), 51 CCC 
(2d) 185, 4 WCB 98 (BCCA), Nemetz CJ for the majority. 
14 [1985] 1 SCR 662, 19 DLR (4th) 314. 
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a corporation to be criminally liable only where the government can identify 
a so-called “directing mind” of the company — an individual “officer or 
managerial-level employee”— who possesses the requisite degree of mens rea 
required for the given criminal offence.15 The identification theory 
“produces the element of mens rea in the corporate entity, otherwise absent 
from the legal entity but present in the natural person, the directing mind” 
and therefore “establishes the ‘identity’ between the directing mind and the 
corporation which results in the corporation being found guilty for the act of 
the natural person, the employee.”16 This rule differs sharply from the 
principle of respondeat superior which the United States Supreme Court 
imported from tort law to define the due process limits to corporate criminal 
liability in the controversial 1909 New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v 
United States case.17 Under respondeat superior, the crime of any employee 
exposes the corporate employer to criminal liability and poses the risk of 
criminalizing corporations for the actions of rogue, low-level employees, even 
when they act against corporate policy. 
Respondeat superior has been widely criticized, in the U.S. and abroad for 
running afoul of the principle that criminal punishment should track with 
actual culpability; its potential for punishing non-guilty entities — even non-
negligent entities — is clear.18 Canada has, therefore, rejected the doctrine, as 
summarized in the Government Response to the Fifteenth Report on the 
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Corporate Liability:  
The Government [of Canada] shares the concerns expressed by many witnesses that 
vicarious liability as applied in the United States is contrary to the principles that 
underlie Canada’s criminal law.  While its rigours are somewhat attenuated by the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines which allow for reductions in the prescribed fine 
in accordance with the corporation’s culpability score, many would argue that under 
Canadian law it would be wrong in principle to impose the stigma of a criminal 
conviction on a corporation when its actions are not morally blameworthy.19 
If respondeat superior runs the risk of over-criminalization, however, the 
identification theory carries the opposite risk. Under the rule of Canadian 
15 Ibid at 682. 
16 Ibid. 
17 212 US 481 at 493–95 (1909). 
18 See e.g. John Hasnas, “The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate 
Criminal Liability” (2009) 46:4 Am Crim L Rev 1329 at 1339. 
19 Canada, Department of Justice, Government Response to the Fifteenth Report of the Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights (Ottawa: DOJ, November 2002), online: <www.ju 
stice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/other-autre/jhr-jdp/hear-aud.html> [perma.cc/PE3D-NTKD]. 
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Dredge and Dock, a corporation may be prosecuted only on proof that a member 
of the board of directors, an officer, or a senior manager has the mens rea to 
commit a particular offence. This would necessarily make it very difficult for 
the Crown to bring charges in cases where (a) a generally lax corporate culture 
emboldens lower level employees to commit crimes in the course of 
employment or (b) systemic breakdowns in internal controls lead to grossly 
negligent conduct that jeopardizes the public.  
It did not take long for both to occur spectacularly enough to raise public 
awareness of the shortcomings of identification theory. On May 9, 1992, 
during the last hours of their four-day shift, 26 miners perished in a methane 
explosion at the Westray Mine in Plymouth, Nova Scotia.20 The mine had 
opened only eight months previously, after Toronto company, Curraugh 
Resources, Inc. won both federal and provincial money for the project, which 
was touted as destined to revitalize the economically-depressed Pictou County. 
Political pressure from both Ottawa and Halifax may explain why the mine 
was permitted to operate despite a letter from the MLA, Bernie Boudreau, to 
Nova Scotia Labour Minister Leroy Legere, alerting him to the fact that the 
mine was using potentially dangerous methods unapproved for coal mining.21 
Curraugh had obtained a special permit to use such methods to tunnel prior 
to reaching the coal seam but not actually to mine coal, and Legere was 
unaware that Curraugh continued to use them three months into the 
mine’s operations.22 Furthermore, mine workers complained of cutbacks in 
safety training and equipment and management’s negligent attitude toward 
safety inspections. When miner Carl Guptill complained about these 
conditions to Labour Ministry inspectors they did not investigate, and 
Guptill was fired.23 
After the disaster, the Nova Scotia government mounted an inquiry 
conducted by Justice K Peter Richard, who concluded that the explosion 
resulted from “incompetence… mismanagement… bureaucratic bungling… 
20 Martin O’Malley, “Westray Remembered: Explosion Killed 26 N.S. Coal Miners in 





23 Caroline O’Conell & Albert J Mills, “The Westray Mine Explosion” in Emmanuel
Raufflet & Alfred J Mills, eds, The Dark Side: Critical Cases on the Downside of Business
(London, UK: Routledge, 2017) 162.
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deceit… ruthlessness… and… cynical indifference.”24 Specifically, Justice 
Richard found that: 
[T]he Westray operation defied the fundamental rules and principles of safe mining 
practice… it clearly rejected industry standards, provincial regulations, codes of safe 
practice, and common sense… Management failed to adopt and effectively promote a 
safety ethic underground. Instead, management, through its actions and attitudes, 
sent a different message — Westray was to produce coal at the expense of worker 
safety.25 
Despite its misconduct, Curraugh Resources (which went bankrupt in 
1993) was never criminally charged.26 The Crown did attempt to prosecute 
mine managers Gerald Phillips and Roger Parry for criminal negligence and 
manslaughter, but the charges were eventually dropped due to insufficiency of 
evidence.27 The identification theory effectively blocked criminal justice for the 
victims of a large-scale, systemic breakdown that resulted in mass loss of life. 
Whatever evidence might have existed that “directing minds” at Curraugh 
were inappropriately pressuring the operators of Westray Mine to begin 
production, it could not, apparently, be proven that any such person had all 
of the requisite mental elements to state a case for homicide.  
One way of stating the problem in the language of causation is that the 
company was, collectively, guilty of gross negligence: no one in the company 
took the requisite steps to mitigate the risks to its miners, created by its 
operations. These omissions caused the deaths.  Had an individual’s culpable 
omissions caused human death, they would have been on the hook for 
negligent homicide. But, because Curraugh was a corporation, there was no 
way to charge it for the collective omissions of all of its employees taken 
together. 
The Westray explosion prompted widespread public outrage. After 12 
years of lobbying, Parliament finally passed Bill C-45 (known as the “Westray 
Bill”) in 2003.28 The Bill amended the Canadian Criminal Code in two ways.  
24 Justice K Peter Richard, “Executive Summary: Report of the Westray Mine Public 
Inquiry” (November 1997) at 3, online (pdf): <ece.uwaterloo.ca/~dwharder/epel/Lect 
ure_materials/Westray.Mine.Public.Inquiry.pdf > [perma.cc/G5J2-VSHB]. 
25 Ibid at 23. 
26 Michael McDonald, “Ceremony Marks the 25th Anniversary of Westray Mine Disaster 




28 Bill C- 45, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Criminal Liability of Organizations), 2nd 
Sess, 37th Parl, 2003 (as passed by the House of Commons 7 November 2003).   
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First, it added section 217.1, creating a duty for workplace supervisors to take 
reasonable steps to prevent bodily harm to their subordinates, the omission to 
perform which would trigger liability in criminal negligence.29 More 
dramatically, it statutorily superseded the identification theory of Canadian 
Dredge, expanding the circumstances under which entities may be criminally 
liable for the crimes of their employees.30 Section 22.1 applies to crimes 
premised on criminal negligence and section 22.2 applies to crimes premised 
on subjective mens rea/fault.31 Under Section 22.1 an entity is liable for 
criminal negligence if: 
(a) acting within the scope of their authority
(i) one of its representatives is a party to the offence, or
(ii) two or more of its representatives engage in conduct, whether by act or
omission, such that, if it had been the conduct of only one representative, that
representative would have been a party to the offence; and
(b) the senior officer who is responsible for the aspect of the organization’s
activities that is relevant to the offence departs — or the senior officers, collectively,
depart — markedly from the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could
reasonably be expected to prevent a representative of the organization from being
a party to the offence.32
Under section 22.2 an entity is liable for a fault-based offence when: 
22.2 … with the intent at least in part to benefit the organization, one of its senior 
officers 
(a) acting within the scope of their authority, is a party to the offence;
(b) having the mental state required to be a party to the offence and acting
within the scope of their authority, directs the work of other representatives of 
the organization so that they do the act or make the omission specified in the 
offence; or 
(c) knowing that a representative of the organization is or is about to be a party
to offence, does not take all reasonable measures to stop them from being a 
party to the offence.33 
These new Criminal Code provisions expand liability beyond that 
allowed by the identification theory, as they allow the criminal conduct or 
negligence of any level of employee to create corporate liability under certain 
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid.  
31 Criminal Code, supra note 3, ss 22.1, 22.2. 
32 Ibid, s 22.1.
33 Ibid, s 22.2.  
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circumstances, so long as there is also some sort of failure of oversight at the 
senior-officer level. Nonetheless, these provisions are somewhat 
complicated in the number of moving evidentiary parts that a prosecutor 
must juggle to prove them. 
In the first place, it took some time for courts to sort out who, exactly, 
counts as a senior officer; recent cases have held that the category includes 
both regional managers and independent agents who manage an important 
aspect of a corporation’s activities.34 These rulings have confirmed the fact 
that the new provisions do indeed expand the scope of corporate criminal 
liability beyond the actions of the board and the c-suite; a senior officer need 
not have policy-making authority, merely operational authority.35 However, 
compared to the rigors of the respondeat superior standard, the Criminal Code 
provisions appear to allow an affirmative defence based on “reasonable 
measures taken by senior officers” with respect to the business units under 
their supervision.36 At the time of Bill C-45’s passage, some scholars were 
optimistic that it improved upon the common law by allowing a court to 
“view corporate decision-making on a collective, rather than an individual 
basis,” when “because of the fragmentation in decision-making in modern 
corporations” it is “hard to point to a single individual and say that his or 
her decisions show a marked departure from the standard of care.”37 
Despite the promise of these new Criminal Code provisions on paper, 
critics of corporate criminal under-enforcement note that they have failed 
to change what is, in essence, a problem of prosecutorial culture. Steven 
Bittle argues that prosecutors continue to treat corporations differently 
from street offenders.38 While the government pursues street crime using a 
punitive, deterrence-based approach, it prefers a “compliance” model for 
corporate criminals, focusing on education and voluntary remediation first, 
with prosecution as a last resort.39 Bittle argues that, given their profit 
incentives to do so, corporations will attempt to circumvent compliance-
34 See R v Pétroles Global Inc, 2013 QCCS 4262; R v Metron Construction Corp, 2013 ONCA 
541. 
35 See Todd Archibald, Ken Jull & Kent Roach, “Corporate Criminal Liability: Myriad 
Complexity in the Scope of Senior Officer” (2014) 60:3 Crim LQ 386 at 390. 
36 Ibid at 388. 
37 Darcy L MacPherson, “Extending Corporate Criminal Liability: Some Thoughts on Bill 
C-45” (2003) 30:3 Man LJ 253 at 283.
38 See Bittle, supra note 11 at 46, 51. 
39 Ibid.  
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based enforcement through falsification and deceit.40 While Bittle’s critique 
of corporate motives may prove a bit too much — assuming, as it does, 
universally bad motivations on the part of business entities — his description 
of the under-enforcement problem rings true. If the democratically enacted 
Criminal Code provides for corporate criminal liability, it is undemocratic 
for the Crown to largely ignore it relative to the crimes of individuals. 
III. THE PERCEPTUAL HARMS OF CORPORATE CRIME
Part of my argument in this paper is that the lack of corporate criminal
enforcement flows from a fundamental, theoretical incoherence in the 
justification for corporate criminal liability. It has been well documented, 
particularly in the context of sexual assault, that prosecutors charge more 
frequently when they understand the nature of the harm at issue in a 
particular class of offence.41 Furthermore, while the criminal law does not, 
itself, appear to create new moral norms among the public at large, it 
appears to strengthen existing norms and, thus, contributes to an increased 
public mandate for enforcement.42 The combined effect of these two 
phenomena means that optimal enforcement depends on a clear 
understanding, among prosecutors and the public at large, of what the 
nature of a particular criminal harm is. 
The existence of corporate criminal liability faces a number of 
conceptual attacks, as a corporation can feel neither remorse nor the shame 
of criminal stigma, nor can it be incarcerated.43 Utilitarian scholars have 
further suggested that criminally punishing corporations results in a net loss 
to society by over-deterring beyond the existing disincentives created by civil 
40 Ibid at 51, 152. 
41 See e.g. Jeffrey W Spears & Cassia C Spohn, “The Genuine Victim and Prosecutors’ 
Charging Decisions in Sexual Assault Cases” (1996) 20:2 American J Crim Justice 183 
at 192–96; Darryl K Brown, “Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of 
Decisions Not to Prosecute” (2018) 103:2 Minn L Rev 843 at 857–59. 
42 Michael C Harper, “Comment on the Tort/Crime Distinction: A Generation Later” 
(1996) 76:1/2 BUL Rev 23 at 25. 
43 See e.g. Hasnas, supra note 18 at 1339; William S Laufer, “Corporate Bodies and Guilty 
Minds” (1994) 43:2 Emory LJ 647 at 655; Gerhard OW Mueller, “Mens Rea and the 
Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal Code Position on Corporate Criminal 
Liability” (1957) 19:1 U Pitt L Rev 21 at 41–46. 
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and regulatory liability.44 In the Canadian context, with Westray looming 
so large as a backdrop, Norm Keith warns that “the history of accountability 
of corporations has often been directed by crisis and ‘moral panic’ more 
than by reasoned, logical application of legal responsibility.”45 Keith further 
contends that the impersonal, “faceless” attributes of a corporation make it 
particularly susceptible to moral panic through manipulations by the media 
and public officials searching for scapegoats.46 
On the other side, proponents of corporate criminal liability argue, 
essentially, that corporations do really bad things: they engage in harmful 
conduct with ill effects on health, environment, worker safety, and so 
forth.47 Yet, this does not adequately address the critics’ arguments. After 
all, if such bad things can be causally attributed to individual human 
employees, then those employees can be prosecuted alone; if not, perhaps 
such bad things cannot, consistent with principles of justice, be criminally 
punished because they cannot be attributed to a particular offender. I argue, 
instead, for a different justification, premised on the fact that when a 
corporation commits a crime, it imposes a distinct set of harms on its victims 
and, by proxy, on society — above and beyond the substantive harms caused 
by the offence — that flow from the nature of the corporate entity itself.48 A 
focus on victims can help prosecutors better understand these harms and 
victim impact statements can transmit them to the public. 
The Criminal Code has long recognized harm to victims as a sentencing 
factor in both individual and corporate prosecutions. Section 718.1 of the 
Criminal Code states that a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender; a 
factor in this proportionality calculus is the harm caused to a victim arising 
from the commission of the offence.49 Scholars note some of the unique 
44 See e.g. Daniel R Fischel & Alan O Sykes, “Corporate Crime” (1996) 25:2 J Leg Stud 
319; VS Khanna, “Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?” (1996) 
109:7 Harv L Rev 1477. 
45 Norm Keith, “Evolution of Corporate Accountability: From Moral Panic to Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (2010) 11:3 Bus L Intl 247 at 247. 
46 Ibid at 260. 
47 See e.g. Pamela H Bucy, “Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does it Make Sense?” 
(2009) 46:4 Am Crim L Rev 1437. 
48 See Erin Sheley, “Perceptual Harm and the Corporate Criminal” (2012) 81:1 U Cin L 
Rev 225 at 228.  
49 Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 718.1; Allan Manson, The Law of Sentencing (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2001) at 84–92. 
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aspects to the relationship between a victim and a corporate offender. As a 
point in favor of Bill C-45, Archibald, Jull, and Roach note that: 
From the victim’s perspective (or in a case such as Westray, the families of victims), 
if it can be shown that criminal activity occurred, it matters not which level of 
management authorized it…. [t]his dichotomy [between policy-makers and 
operators] is viewed as a way of isolating the board of directors and the 
corporation.50  
On the other hand, Norm Keith points out the potential difficulties in 
identifying the victims of a particular corporate offence, which might be 
obvious in cases of fraud against a particular group of shareholders, but 
harder to determine in cases of mass bacterial infections resulting from 
corporate action assisted by a provincial government’s failure to meet clean 
water regulatory requirements.51 
Just as sentencing courts focus on the degree of harm caused by 
particular corporations, prosecutors should charge more corporations in the 
first place due to the kinds of harms corporations cause their victims. In 
addition to the obvious material harms — which may vary as between 
economic, environmental, physical, etc. depending on the offence — there 
is a separate class of harms common to those types of corporate crime with 
discernible victims. I call these “perceptual harms”.52 Perceptual harms 
amount to the empirically demonstrated sense of helplessness a victim feels 
when faced with a perpetrator that is temporally enduring, powerful, and 
materially complex.53 When a corporate offender continues to exist after it 
commits a crime, it can shatter a victim’s “belief in a just world”:54 a 
psychological heuristic crucial to a person’s wellbeing. This is a unique sort 
50 Todd Archibald, Kenneth Jull & Kent Roach, “The Changed Face of Corporate 
Criminal Liability” (2004) 48:3 Crim LQ 367 at 393. 
51 Norm Keith, “Sentencing the Corporate Offender: From Deterrence to Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (2010) 56:3 Crim LQ 294 at 315 [Keith, “Sentencing the 
Corporate Offender”]. 
52 See Sheley, supra note 48. 
53 Ibid at 259–63. 
54 See e.g. Jozef Dzuka & Claudia Dalbert, “The Belief in a Just World and Subjective 
Well-Being in Old Age” (2006) 10:5 Aging & Mental Health 439 at 442. See Melvin J 
Lerner & Carolyn H Simmons, “Observer’s Reaction to the ‘Innocent Victim’: 
Compassion or Rejection?” (1966) 4:2 J Personality & Soc Psychology 203; Melvin J 
Lerner, “The Justice Motive: Some Hypotheses as to its Origins and Forms” (1977) 45:1 
J Personality 1; Melvin J Lerner, Dale T Miller & John G Holmes, “Deserving and the 
Emergence of Forms of Justice” (1976) 9 Advances in Experimental Soc Psychology 133. 
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of harm flowing from the corporate structure itself.55 
As an example, consider the long-term sociological and psychological 
costs of a corporate environmental crime.56 The psychological literature has 
documented a particular sort of harm in victims of the major oil spills of 
the last several decades: evidence suggests the psychological harm 
experienced by victims to be exacerbated by the corporate nature of the 
responsible entities and issues related to assignation of blame. In addition 
to the immediate physical losses suffered by the victims of technological 
disaster, the victims’ communities also suffer a long-term social 
deterioration described as “the corrosive community”.57 The literature 
attributes part of this corrosive effect to the members of a community 
struggling over where to place blame, authorities being evasive and 
unresponsive, and victims becoming suspicious and cynical.58 
Psychologist Deborah du Nann Winter, whose expertise centers on the 
psychological effects of environmental damage, has observed from her 
studies of victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill that the primary 
emotional reaction among these victims is “anger… around the oil 
companies’ failure to abide by regulations” as well as “helplessness” (which 
she explains by noting the phenomenon of “learned helplessness,” which is 
the tendency of organisms to become non-responsive in the face of 
situations over which they have no control).59 Again, the structural 
relationship between the corporation and the background legal authority 
that supports it can be directly linked to the psychological damage 
experienced by victims. I now turn to the evidentiary mechanism by which 
prosecutors who understand the nature of the perceptual harm experienced 
55 See Sheley, supra note 48. 
56 See William R Freudenburg, “Contamination, Corrosion, and the Social Order: An 
Overview” (1997) 45:3 Current Sociology 19; William R Freudenburg & Timothy R 
Jones, “Attitudes and Stress in the Presence of Technological Risks: A Test of the 
Supreme Court Hypothesis” (1991) 69:4 Soc Forces 1143; Krzysztof Kaniasty & Fran 
H Norris, “A Test of the Support Deterioration Model in the Context of Natural 
Disaster” (1993) 64:3 J Personality & Soc Psychology 395; J Stephen Kroll-Smith & 
Stephen Couch, “Symbols, Ecology, and Contamination: Case Studies in the 
Ecological-Symbolic Approach to Disaster” (1993) 5 Research in Soc Problems & Public 
Policy 47. 
57 See Freudenburg, supra, at 56. 
58 See Freudenburg & Jones, supra note 56. 
59 Susan Koger, “Coping with the Deepwater Horizon Disaster: An Ecopsychology 
Interview with Deborah Du Nann Winter” (2010) 2:4 Ecopsychology 205 at 205. 
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by corporate victims may use that knowledge to increase and mobilize 
existing public support for white-collar prosecutions. 
IV. THE EVIDENTIARY ROLE OF VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
The crime victim’s rights as a stakeholder in the Canadian criminal
justice system have long been recognized60 and, as mentioned previously, 
sentencing courts must consider the degree of harm to victims in applying 
the proportionality principle expressed in section 718.1 of the Criminal 
Code.61 In 1988, the federal and provincial ministers responsible for 
criminal justice endorsed the Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice 
for Victims of Crime, “in recognition that all persons have the full protection 
of rights guaranteed by the [Charter]” and “the rights of victims and 
offenders need to be balanced.”62 They have recently been the focus of 
greater attention with the passage of the Canadian Victims Bill of Rights in 
2015.63 The Bill provides the victim with a range of rights, including to be 
apprised of the status of the investigation of and proceedings against their 
offender and certain rights of privacy and security. It also provides that 
“[e]very victim has the right to present a victim impact statement to the 
appropriate authorities in the criminal justice system and to have it 
considered.”64 The right to present a victim impact statement had existed 
long before the Bill of Rights; it became statutory with earlier amendments 
to the Criminal Code in 198865 and enhanced with additional amendments 
in 1999. Currently, subsection 722(1) of the Criminal Code provides: 
When determining the sentence to be imposed on an offender or determining 
whether the offender should be discharged under section 730 in respect of any 
offence, the court shall consider any statement of a victim prepared in accordance 
with this section and filed with the court describing the physical or emotional 
60 See Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1999); Leslie Sebba, Third Parties, Victims and the Criminal Justice System (Columbus, 
Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1996); Alan N Young, Justice for All: The Past, Present 
and Future of Victims in Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1997). 
61 Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 718.1. 
62 Canada, Department of Justice, Canadian Statement of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime, 2003 (Ottawa: DOJ, last modified 7 January 2015), online: <www.justice.gc.ca 
/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/victim/03/princ.html> [perma.cc/XH7Y-9MA6]. 
63 Canadian Victims Bill of Rights, SC 2015, c 13, s 2. 
64 Ibid, s 15. 
65 Criminal Code, supra note 3. 
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harm, property damage or economic loss suffered by the victim as the result of the 
commission of the offence and the impact of the offence on the victim.66 
Prosecutors should pay closer attention to the particular impacts of 
corporate crime on its victims and use that understanding to promote the 
role of the victim in corporate prosecutions. Specifically, where prosecutors 
can identify victims, they should encourage them to read victim impact 
statements (VIS) during corporate sentencing proceedings as frequently as 
they do in cases of violent crime. This would begin to break down the 
conceptual barrier between corporate and individual crime, which may 
obscure the criminal nature of corporate conduct and also better link the 
project of criminalizing corporations to some version of the harm 
principle,67 as opposed to goals of prosecutorial economy. 
This argument raises initial questions, based on what we know so far 
about how VIS operate in the criminal justice system. While there does not 
appear to be recent empirical data on this question, it seems that only a 
distinct minority of victims avail themselves of the opportunity to make 
such statements.68 A 1990 study found that victims’ rate of refusal to give a 
statement was twice as high in cases of property crime as opposed to other 
sorts of crime.69 Furthermore, a study of the effect of victim impact 
statements on actual sentencing outcomes in Calgary found no discernible 
impact on actual sentence.70 Reviewing this rather inconclusive data, Julian 
Roberts concluded that “[w]e cannot exclude the possibility that VIS have 
had limited impact on victims’ satisfaction in large measure because of the 
way in which they have been conceptualized, operationalized and 
administered” and on that basis called for “a clearer and consensual vision 
of the nature and function of a VIS.”71 
66 Ibid, s 722(1).  
67 See R v Labaye, 2005 SCC 80. 
68 Canada, Research Development Directorate, Victim Impact Statements in Canada, vol 7, 
by Carolina Giliberti (Ottawa: DOJ, 1990) (reporting that victims completed statements 
in 23% of trials) at 12. 
69 Ibid at table 1. 
70 Canada, Research Development Directorate, Victim Impact Statements in Canada, 
Evaluation of the Calgary Project (Background Paper), vol 2, by Judith Muir (Ottawa: DOJ, 
1990) at 95. 
71 Julian V Roberts, “Victim Impact Statements and the Sentencing Process: Recent 
Developments and Research Findings” (2003) 47:3 Crim LQ 365 at 395–96. See also 
Ashley Smith, “Victim Impact Statements: Redefining Victim” (2011) 57:2/3 Crim LQ 
346 (arguing for a redefinition of the term “victim” in the CCC to limit the number of 
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Perhaps the biggest challenge to making good use of VIS is that prior 
research suggests courts are uncertain as to precisely what end they are 
supposed to “consider” them when making sentencing determinations.72 
More recently, Marie Manikis has conducted a review of appellate court 
decisions to attempt to answer this question.73 She finds that some courts 
recognize that VIS provide information about the harm which serves as 
either an aggravating or mitigating factor in sentencing.74 Other courts, 
however, suggest that VIS are supposed to serve a purely expressive purpose 
and should not affect sentencing outcomes at all.75 
Other scholars fear that VIS increase the systemic injustice of criminal 
law. Susan Bandes fears that they mobilize negative emotions against the 
defendant: they “evoke not merely sympathy, pity, and compassion for the 
victim, but also a complex set of emotions directed toward the defendant, 
including hatred, fear, racial animus, vindictiveness, undifferentiated 
vengeance, and the desire to purge collective anger.”76 She argues that they 
shift the focus away from the defendant’s moral culpability and toward “a 
thirst for undifferentiated vengeance.”77 She also believes that the narratives 
developed during the guilt phase of the trial are already stacked against the 
defendant by the time that sentencing takes place.78 Martha Minow opposes 
victim evidence for fear that it will encourage dueling victim narratives 
between the victim and defendant; she urges that the system adopt 
normative standards for evaluating “historical” harm experienced by 
oppressed groups, as opposed to individuals.79 Jennifer Culbert sees VIS as 
inappropriately establishing the suffering of the victim as an 
people qualifying to give VIS and thereby impose greater order on the sentencing 
proceeding). 
72 Roberts, supra note 71 at 370–71. 
73 Manikis, “Victim Impact Statements at Sentencing: Towards a Clearer Understanding 
of Their Aims” (2015) 65:2 UTLJ 85.      
74 Ibid at 95, citing R v Cook, 2009 QCCA 2423; R v G(K), 2010 ONCA 177; Steeves v R, 
2010 NBCA 57; R v Revet, 2010 SKCA 71. 
75 Ibid at 97, citing R v M(W), 2010 BCCA 370; Doucet v R, 2013 QCCA 1778; R v Karim, 
2014 ABCA 88; R v Alexander, 2014 ONCA 22. 
76 Susan Bandes, “Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements” (1996) 63:2 U 
Chicago L Rev 361 at 395. 
77 Ibid at 398. See also Steven G Gey, “Justice Scalia’s Death Penalty” (1992) 20:1 Fla St 
UL Rev 67 at 123; Martha C Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy” (1993) 22:2 Philosophy 
& Public Affairs 83 at 89–90.  
78 Bandes, supra note 76 at 400. 
79 Martha Minow, “Surviving Victim Talk” (1992) 40:6 UCLA L Rev 1411 at 1438. 
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incontrovertible basis for deciding punishment in an otherwise pluralistic 
and morally relativistic society.80  
While these are all valid and important concerns, such arguments rely 
heavily on a bi-lateral view of sentencing in which the victim’s only function 
is to oppose the interests of the defendant. Indeed, many popular arguments 
in favour of VIS rely on similar, but symmetrically opposite, grounds: we 
should prioritize the victim’s individual needs over the defendant’s by 
allowing VIS.81 Manikis proposes that we create a balance between 
presumably victim-focused expressive goals (which she characterizes 
primarily as allowing for the release of emotion) and the instrumental goal 
of informing the sentencing court about actual harm.82 She would allow the 
victim to speak broadly, even to make “emotional outbursts” for expressive 
purposes, but would require the court to “discard the part unrelated to harm 
when crafting and deciding the severity of a sentence.”83 
I have argued elsewhere that the current debate on the victim’s 
participation in the criminal sentencing process ignores how the complexity 
of a victim narrative effectively conveys to the sentencing body the 
community’s experience of harm, without which the criminal justice system 
loses its legitimacy as a penal authority.84 This full account of public harm 
is crucial to the retributive function of sentencing and if it is excluded, the 
system risks perceptions of illegitimacy.85 The narrative features of VIS work 
to make a victim’s harm accessible to a listener and, because these victim 
stories also circulate through society outside of the courtroom, they shape 
80 Jennifer Culbert, “The Sacred Name of Pain: The Role of Victim Impact Statements in 
Death Penalty Sentencing Decisions” in Austin Sarat, ed, Pain, Death and the Law (Ann 
Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press, 2004) 103. 
81 See e.g. Jonathan Simon, “Fearless Speech in the Killing State: The Power of Capital 
Crime Victim Speech” (2004) 82:4 NCL Rev 1377 at 1383 (arguing that the state’s 
tendency, in recent years, to fetishize the “crime victim” has been a justification for 
conservative criminal legislation); Kenji Yoshino, “The City and the Poet” (2005) 114:8 
Yale LJ 1835 at 1884 (arguing that VIS do not serve the ends of “fairness,” which he 
defines explicitly as allowing the defendant to assume the “narrative posture… of a 
Scheherazade, telling stories to the state so she may live… untrammeled by other 
voices”).  
82 Manikis, supra note 73 at 109–13. 
83 Ibid at 113. 
84 Erin Sheley, “Reverberations of the Victim’s Voice: Victim Impact Statements and the 
Cultural Project of Punishment” (2012) 87:3 Ind LJ 1247 at 1277.  
85 Ibid. 
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social norms about culpability.86 If the sentencing process cannot 
accommodate victim stories it risks illegitimacy in the eyes of a society 
guided by these norms.87 It also risks allowing undifferentiated stereotypes, 
developed by political and media actors, to take the place of individuated 
victim accounts in the mind of a fact-finder.88 This argument, of course, 
relates to the retributive function of VIS within a criminal trial and the 
importance of what such statements convey to the sentencing body itself —
what Manikis would refer to as their “instrumental” function.  
But VIS also have an external or expressive function, which the rise of 
social media has compounded by transmitting unmediated trial narratives 
through public spaces that they have not penetrated in the past.89 This 
“expressive” function is more complex than simply serving, as Manikis 
conceives of it, as a therapeutic opportunity for victims to release emotion. 
There is also a public expressive function to the criminal justice system. The 
traditional media has long distorted public perceptions about crime and 
punishment, thereby undermining the expressive function of criminal 
justice.90 The traditional Marxist critique of the media asserts that those in 
power manipulate the press to harness support for policies that criminalize 
those with the least power in society.91 However, the “left realist” school of 
criminology points out that the whole of public concern about crime is 
hardly the product of false consciousness. There are quite rational reasons 
to fear crime and many people, in fact, fear it due to direct interaction with 
actual victims.92 Unmediated victim narratives have, therefore, always been 
an important source of information about actual criminal harm, particularly 
harm to victims ignored by the prevailing media account.  
86 Ibid at 1277–84. 
87 Ibid at 1285. 
88 Ibid. 
89 See Erin Sheley, “Victim Impact Statements and Expressive Punishment in the Age of 
Social Media” (2017) 52 Wake Forest L Rev 157 at 158 [Sheley, “Expressive 
Punishment”]. 
90 Ibid at 159. 
91 Yvonne Jewkes, Media and Crime, 3rd ed (London, UK: Sage Publications, 2015) at 24. 
92 See e.g. Jock Young, “The Tasks Facing a Realist Criminology” (1987) 11:4 
Contemporary Crises 337 at 337 (arguing that perceptions of crime are largely 
“constructed out of the material experiences of people rather than fantasies impressed 
upon them by the media or agencies of the State”); Adam Crawford et al, Second Islington 
Crime Survey (London, UK: Middlesex Polytechnic Centre for Criminology, 1990) 
(arguing that “in inner city areas, mass media coverage of crime tends to reinforce what 
people already know”). 
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So-called “viral” victim narratives about police violence attendant to the 
Black Lives Matter movement, as well as the uniquely impactful victim 
impact statement delivered by Jane Doe in the Stanford rape case, illustrate 
how the expressive function of punishment has become even more critical 
in light of “new” media.93 One could argue, of course, that victim narratives 
can be disseminated without being first expressed during a formal 
sentencing hearing — the police violence videos are a good example of this. 
Yet, to the extent that institutions of justice support these narratives by 
providing a forum for their expression and dissemination, the institutions 
themselves are participating in what Anthony Duff describes as the 
“communicative” purpose of punishment.94 Punishment sends a message to 
the offender about their conduct, to the victim about their worth in the eyes 
of the community, and to the community about what we morally require 
from one another.95 The system serves this purpose better if it incorporates 
unmediated victim narratives into this process. 
The recent Calgary case of Carey and Cody Manyshots demonstrates 
the interaction between VIS, social media, and the perceived legitimacy of 
the justice system on the part of the general public. The Manyshots brothers 
kidnapped a 17-year-old girl from a bus stop, kept her prisoner, and sexually 
assaulted her repeatedly.96 Because the victim did not feel emotionally able 
to read her statement aloud to the trial court, the Crown prosecutor asked 
the court to exercise its discretion to allow the prosecutor to read the 
statement on behalf of the victim.97 The Court refused and a local social 
media firestorm followed.98 (A Facebook page linking to one article on the 
topic had, two weeks after the decision, received 370 “reactions” and 133 
comments.)  
One representative commenter underscored the communal importance 
of the VIS:  
Ridiculous, the reason its [sic] called a victim impact statement is clear, so the 
victim gets to share the pain and suffering that resulted from the crime. Judges 
93 Sheley, “Expressive Punishment”, supra note 89. 
94 RA Duff, “Guidance and Guidelines” (2005) 105:4 Colum L Rev 1162 at 1182. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Nancy Hixt, “Judge’s decision on victim impact statement in Manyshots brothers’ case 
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should uphold that civic right as a part of our legal system no matter what. Taking 
away the victims [sic] voice is as disgusting as taking away our freedom. I am 
reinforced in my belief that judges, cops and prosecutors are totally indifferent to 
the rights of the individual. They hold the balance of power and we are lead around 
like cattle in a broken system.  
By linking the idea of a silenced victim to a general loss of civic freedom, 
this commenter emphasizes the expressive importance of such statements. 
As Duff theorizes, they implicate not only the system’s obligation to 
communicate to the victim its condemnation of his or her victimizer, but 
to relay this message to the rest of the polity. The victim’s account of her 
harm is not only an account of her individual harm but of how her 
community itself has been harmed through the crime against her. While 
fairness may require courts to exclude certain statements under certain 
circumstances, it does so at the risk of negatively impacting public faith in 
systemic legitimacy.  
In sum, particularly in the era of “viral” social media content, VIS can 
be used to vindicate the rights of the powerless against the powerful as easily 
as they can be used to increase the punitiveness of the justice system against 
certain defendants. And, in our status quo universe, in which VIS will 
continue to be used in the latter capacity, there is arguably a greater moral 
imperative to use them in the former as well. Corporate criminal 
punishment provides an ideal setting for this endeavor. It is hard to think 
of a greater power asymmetry than that existing between a corporate 
defendant, on the one hand, and an individual human victim, on the other. 
We do not have examples of many victim impact statements at 
corporate criminal trials, but it is helpful to consider a couple of victim 
narratives about corporate harm occurring in other formal settings. 
Consider, for example, the victims of the 1972 Buffalo Creek disaster, in 
which a coal slurry dam owned by the Pittston Corporation burst and 
caused 125 citizens of Logan County, West Virginia to drown in black 
sludge99 (additionally, the property destruction left 4,000 people 
homeless).100 Despite the fact that the investigation determined that the 
dam had violated numerous federal and state safety regulations, no 
criminal charges were ever filed against the Pittston Corporation, its 
subsidiary Buffalo Mining Co, or any of their officers.  The citizens of the 
99 Gerald M Stern, The Buffalo Creek Disaster (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1977) at 11. 
100  Ibid. 
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Buffalo Creek area formed a Citizens Commission to investigate the 
disaster, which concluded:  
We think that this coal company, Pittston, has murdered the people, and we call 
upon the prosecuting attorney and the judge…to prosecute and bring to trial this 
coal company…the fact of the matter is that these are all laws on the books which 
the company felt completely free to ignore, which says something about the 
relationship between coal companies and state governments…just this complete 
freedom to ignore these laws with no fear of any kind of prosecution.101 
These words make explicit the perceptual harms that corporate crime 
imposes on its victims. The Buffalo Creek victims’ commission identified, 
as part of the trauma the community had suffered, their comparative 
helplessness relative to a company with (a) continued temporal existence and 
(b) some sort of interrelationship with structures of state power.
Very similar themes appear in the congressional testimony of Keith
Jones, whose son Gordon died on the Deepwater Horizon: “TransOcean, 
Halliburton, and any other company will be back because they have the 
infrastructure and economic might to make more money. But Gordon will 
never be back. Never. And neither will the 10 good men who died with 
him.”102 
Again, it is not only the loss of Gordon that Jones identifies here but 
the asymmetry between that loss and the impossibility of an equivalent loss 
on the side of an enduring entity like Halliburton. The disruption to the 
belief-in-a-just-world heuristic, as discussed above, resulting from perceived 
unfairness, appears in both of these accounts of suffering due to 
unpunished or inadequately punished corporate crime. 
These victim narratives draw attention to the sine qua non of a corporate 
criminal act — to that which justifies punishing the institution itself above 
and beyond the culpable individual actors that can and should also be 
charged where possible. It is not just that the harm imposed by corporations 
is severe. That can be true and yet, it can still be the case that punishing 
both individual employees and the corporation is redundant if the latter is 
101  Appalshop’s Buffalo Creek Film Preservation & Digital Outreach Project, “The Buffalo 
Creek Flood: An Act of Man Transcript” (1975) at 5, online (pdf): <buffalocreekflood.o 
rg/media/BCF-transcript.pdf> [perma.cc/M3CM-7KCW]. 
102  US, Legal Liability Issues Surrounding the Gulf Coast Oil Disaster: Hearing Before the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong (2010) at 25 (Keith Jones), online: <www.govinfo. 
gov/content/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg56642/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg56642.pdf> [perma.cc/ 
9MT8-FLKB]. 
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punished for the same harm as the former. The issue is that the psychic 
harm posed by corporate crime is distinct in kind. 
From these premises it becomes clear that victim narratives have the 
potential to give coherence to a conceptually unstable area of the criminal 
law. In the first place, the use of VIS at corporate sentencing provides 
evidence of the distinctly corporate aspects of victim harm for a sentencing 
body, whose job it is to dispense appropriate punishment. In the second, 
where the Crown’s under-enforcement of the Criminal Code against 
corporations may be a substantially cultural, rather than doctrinal, problem, 
the expressive function of VIS may serve to reflect and enhance social norms 
about corporate criminality and thereby bring popular demand for 
corporate prosecutions more in line with that for individual criminals. 
V. REMEDIATION AGREEMENTS AND CORPORATE VICTIMS: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The timing of this article renders it impossible to leave the topic of VIS 
as evidence of corporate criminal harm in Canada without at least 
considering the recent sea change in white-collar enforcement. In 
September 2018, after many years of discussion and recent months of 
lobbying, Parliament adopted amendments to the Criminal Code allowing 
the Crown to use remediation agreements to resolve cases of organizational 
misconduct. Modeled after the deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) 
pioneered by the United States Department of Justice, remediation 
agreements provide a mechanism for a corporation to settle a criminal 
investigation without having to resort to a guilty plea.  
According to section 715.31 of the Criminal Code, the agreements have 
the following objectives: 
(a) to denounce an organization’s wrongdoing and the harm that the wrongdoing
has caused to victims or to the community; 
(b) to hold the organization accountable for its wrongdoing through effective,
proportionate and dissuasive penalties; 
(c) to contribute to respect for the law by imposing an obligation on the
organization to put in place corrective measures and promote a compliance 
culture; 
(d) to encourage voluntary disclosure of the wrongdoing;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
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(f) to reduce the negative consequences of the wrongdoing for persons —
employees, customers, pensioners and others — who did not engage in the 
wrongdoing, while holding responsible those individuals who did engage in that 
wrongdoing.103 
Subsection 715.32(2) instructs that prosecutors, in determining whether to 
offer a remediation agreement, should consider the following factors: 
(a) the circumstances in which the act or omission that forms the basis of the
offence was brought to the attention of investigative authorities; 
(b) the nature and gravity of the act or omission and its impact on any victim;
(c) the degree of involvement of senior officers of the organization in the act or
omission; 
(d) whether the organization has taken disciplinary action, including termination
of employment, against any person who was involved in the act or omission; 
(e) whether the organization has made reparations or taken other measures to
remedy the harm caused by the act or omission and to prevent the commission of 
similar acts or omissions; 
(f) whether the organization has identified or expressed a willingness to identify
any person involved in wrongdoing related to the act or omission; 
(g) whether the organization — or any of its representatives — was convicted of an
offence or sanctioned by a regulatory body, or whether it entered into a previous 
remediation agreement or other settlement, in Canada or elsewhere, for similar 
acts or omissions; 
(h) whether the organization — or any of its representatives — is alleged to have
committed any other offences, including those not listed in the schedule to this 
Part; and 
(i) any other factor that the prosecutor considers relevant.104
Judging by the American experience with DPAs, this new addition has 
the potential to exacerbate the under-enforcement problems discussed 
above. In the U.S., the rise of the era of deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements has meant that greater numbers of criminal corporations escape 
formal criminal charges entirely, in exchange for paying fines and making 
stipulated changes to internal governance.105 These agreements are 
“mutually beneficial” to the extent that they make life easier for prosecutors, 
who can avoid the massive discovery process involved in taking a 
103  Criminal Code, supra note 3, s 715.31. 
104  Ibid, s 715.32(2). 
105  David M Uhlmann, “Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of 
Corporate Criminal Liability” (2013) 72:4 Md L Rev 1295 at 1298. 
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corporation to trial, and for corporations, who can avoid the sting of 
criminal conviction and its collateral effects (especially the risk of being 
barred from business with the government), which was the major concern 
of SNC-Lavalin.  
While the U.S. Department of Justice’s official factors for determining 
whether a corporation should be criminally charged include “the risk of 
harm to the public” posed by the crime committed (and the reciprocal costs 
of a prosecution to both the public and innocent third parties such as 
employees), they also include such factors as “remedial efforts” and 
“willingness to cooperate.”106 The prevalence of DPAs thus ties much of 
federal criminal enforcement against corporations to the relative ease with 
which the two sides can strike a bargain, as opposed to the degree of actual 
harm to human victims. The use of DPAs and NPAs is not even consistent 
across the DOJ: the Environment and Natural Resources Division and the 
Antitrust Division rarely use them, while the Criminal Division and some 
United States Attorney’s offices resort to them more often than not.107 
The gap between the primary American substantive culpability standard 
and the DOJ’s extremely nuanced factors to guide prosecutorial decision-
making has created, what some scholars have referred to as, problems of 
incongruence. As William Laufer and Alan Strudler put it: 
First, forward problems emerge where changes in the general part of the law—
liability rules and culpability standards—are conceived without concern for how 
punishment is crafted or justified.  And reverse problems arise where standards for 
punishment impose liability or culpability that conflict with extant law in theory 
or practice.108 
As Laufer and Strudler argue, the federal charging guidelines wholly 
abandon the rule of respondeat superior and instead measure “features of the 
corporate person,” particularly as measured by post-offence behaviour 
which “may bear little correspondence to the underlying offence.”109 Other 
scholars note that the massive increase in corporate cooperation with 
criminal investigations has unintentionally blurred the line between the 
106  US, Department of Justice, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations 
(Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2019) at s 9-28.300, online: <www.justice.gov 
-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations> [perma.cc/UJ8J-WZFJ].
107  Uhlmann, supra note 105 at 1301. 
108  William S Laufer & Alan Strudler, “Corporate Crime and Making Amends” (2007) 
44:4 Am Crim L Rev 1307 at 1311. 
109  Ibid. 
446   MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL| VOLUME 43 ISSUE 3 
prosecuting government and the private entity being prosecuted.110 This 
results in doctrinal problems such as as: the risk of corporations qualifying 
as agents of the state for the purposes of Constitutional exclusionary rules; 
the risk of undermining employees’ Fifth Amendment protections against 
self-incrimination; the possibility of the government being deemed “in 
control” of corporate documents for the purposes of discovery requests by 
individual employees; and prosecutors acting “beyond their institutional 
competence” by adopting corporate oversight roles.111 
How all of these concerns shake out in Canadian doctrine remains, of 
course, to be seen. It is encouraging that subsection 715.32(2)(b) specifically 
mentions harm to victims as a relevant factor, which is not considered in 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s charging guidelines related to DPAs. To 
the extent that DPAs have allowed American prosecutors carte blanche to 
threaten over-enforcement without the need for a complicated criminal 
trial, they are less likely to have that effect in Canada, simply due to the 
more nuanced liability standard for corporate criminal mens rea required by 
sections 22.1 and 22.2. Corporations that feel like they could beat criminal 
charges under those provisions are less likely to agree to remediation 
agreements where the evidence suggests that the Crown would not be able 
to prove the necessary elements at trial. The availability of such agreements 
is, however, far more likely to exacerbate the more pressing problem of 
under-enforcement. If prosecutors are already reluctant to bring charges 
against corporations due to the complicated discovery process such trials 
entail, it stands to reason that they will be even less likely to do so with an 
easier option at hand. Attention to victim harm — not only by prosecutors 
and courts, but by the public in general — may prove an important buffer 
against such a risk. 
At the end of the day, Canadian criminal enforcement against 
corporations remains in a state of ferment. The 2004 amendments to the 
Criminal Code came from a sudden public awareness of the nature of 
corporate negligence and the material harms to victims it causes. The SNC-
Lavalin affair has again thrown the specter of corporate lawlessness into the 
public sphere. While not all cases of corporate crime have easy-to-identify 
victims, where they exist, their narratives provide important evidence of the 
110  See generally Barry A Bohrer & Barbara L Trencher, “Prosecution Deferred: Exploring 
the Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation” (2007) 44:4 Am 
Crim L Rev 1481. 
111  Ibid. 
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nature of corporate criminal harm. The expressive value of victim impact 
statements in providing coherence to the project of corporate criminal 
liability is particularly high in this ever-changing environment. 
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